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Figure 1: Computer-generated images created with the Blender modelling software and the Cycles rendering engine. 
ABSTRACT 
The use of computer-generated imagery is becoming increasingly 
ubiquitous across many fields including media, advertising, 
architecture and art. This represents a fundamental shift within 
visual culture, as imagery can now be produced routinely by 
means of rendering algorithms based on spatial representations. 
We propose that the account of the image provided by Gilles 
Deleuze in his books on cinema provides a rich philosophical 
framework for understanding such contemporary imaging 
practices. By providing a Deleuzian reading of James Kajiya's 1986 
rendering equation we argue that there is a tacit ontology of the 
image underwriting both Deleuze’s work on cinema and current 
computer graphics technologies. This ontology frees the image 
from traditional transcendent categories of subject positions or 
vantage points and instead revolves around the concept of an 
immanent image. We argue that these considerations lead us to a 
reformulation of the notion of the virtual, one that challenges its 
rigid segregation from the real. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Computing methodologies → Rendering   • Computing 
methodologies → Perception   • Computing methodologies → 
Virtual reality   • Applied computing → Fine arts   • Applied 
computing → Media arts 
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1 Introduction 
In an ArtForum article from 2017, the architectural historian 
Mario Carpo considers the state of contemporary imaging 
technology and argues that we are moving from an image culture 
to a spatial culture [4]. This seems a somewhat counter-intuitive 
suggestion given that the image is more ubiquitous than ever, but 
Carpo is not suggesting that the cultural importance of the image 
is diminishing or disappearing. What he is suggesting is that the 
means of production of the image is changing, and that a new 
conceptual understanding of the image is needed in order to 
grapple with the new imaging landscape in which we find 
ourselves. 
This new spatial culture that Carpo identifies is motivated by 
the idea that contemporary imaging technologies have moved 
from a focus on the digitisation of the image to the digitisation of 
space.  Earlier digital imaging technologies sought to replicate and 
extend traditional imaging approaches. Digital photography 
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mimicked analogue photography by replacing the film with a 
sensor, and the darkroom with sophisticated software for 
manipulating the resulting image. In both cases though, the start 
and end point is an image; which for the moment we take to mean 
a two dimensional representation of some part of a three 
dimensional space. 
Another tradition of digital imaging technology starts instead 
with the idea of producing a representation of that three-
dimensional space and then using software to generate images 
from that representation. A furniture designer might work by 
creating 3D models using Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
software and then render images of the proposed design. While 
the chair that the furniture designer is creating is not (yet) a real 
object, the same process can easily be applied to real objects using 
techniques such as 3D scanning and photogrammetry. In each 
case what is being produced is not a single image from one fixed 
viewpoint but instead a quasi-mathematical description of the 
object that precisely details its extension within a three-
dimensional space. 
An imaging technology that incorporates such spatial 
representations as its first step can then algorithmically generate 
images ad infinitum and given the advances in rendering 
techniques that we have seen over the last two decades, these 
images also become increasingly indistinguishable from images 
produced by more conventional means. The computer graphics 
techniques underpinning this have been in existence for some 
time and form the basis of now familiar imaging technologies such 
as Computer Generated Imagery (CGI), Virtual Reality (VR) and 
architectural visualisation. However, where we might once have 
regarded these as niche sub-fields of image production, we would 
argue that recent improvements in accessibility, ease of use, and 
quality of results, should motivate us to consider them as now 
central to the image production process of contemporary visual 
culture. As an example of this, it has been widely reported that 
IKEA now use computer-generated imagery for the majority of 
the pictures in their product catalogues [17]. These images 
masquerade as photographs, and the customers leafing through 
the catalogues are encouraged to read them as such, yet they are 
in fact the outputs of rendering algorithms; algorithms that 
generate imagery from digitised spatial representations. 
To take some further examples: Google employ roaming 
mobile 3D scanning vehicles to generate the data for their Google 
Earth application; producing a digitised version of our world 
space that is so vast it brings to mind Borges's vision of a map of 
the world that equals or even exceeds the detail of the world itself 
[3]. Microsoft's Photosynth software does something similar but 
uses crowd-sourced photographs of a physical location to extract 
spatial information that it can then use to automatically generate 
new images [19]. Hugely popular sandbox video games such as 
Minecraft and The Sims put the power to create digital spatial 
representations in the hands of their users, who build intricate and 
elaborate worlds that they can then navigate around, with the 
game generating real time imagery of their efforts as they do so. 
 
1 To our knowledge, the only significant analysis of the rendering equation that 
approaches it from the perspective of visual culture or the philosophy of the image 
is by Friedrich Kittler [16]. 
Carpo's interest in this phenomenon is centred on the 
epistemological implications of moving from a culture that 
initially describes the world around it textually, to one that 
favours visual depictions, and then on to one that prioritises 
mathematical spatial representations. Our interest however is in 
the ontological implications for the image itself. How should we 
think these new types of images? In what way do they differ from, 
or are they similar to, more traditional forms of imaging? How are 
we to understand what is depicted in these images? In what way 
do they challenge or disrupt ideas such as photographic 
indexicality? What relationship do they have to our perceptual 
experience and to our grasp of concepts such as the real and the 
virtual? 
Our approach to exploring these questions is to situate them 
within the philosophical framework of Gilles Deleuze. Specifically 
we draw upon the reformulation of the concept of the image that 
he offers in his Cinema 1 book [8]. Deleuze presents a highly 
original account of the universe as an immanent flux of imagery, 
with perception being an acentred process that makes selections 
or slices through this flux. We argue that this provides a useful 
means of characterising the digital imaging milieu in which we 
find now ourselves, particularly with respect to how it disrupts 
conventional notions of subjectivity as normally employed within 
visual culture. We therefore begin by providing an account of the 
image according to Deleuze, with a particular focus on the concept 
of immanence as it applies to imagery.  
Moving on to explore the connections between Deleuze and 
computer-generated imagery is problematic for many reasons, not 
least of which is that we are dealing with a wide array of imaging 
technologies and approaches, only some of which we have alluded 
to above. Carpo performs a useful service by identifying the 
spatial basis of these emerging techniques but we focus on 
another fundamental enabling component. James Kajiya's 
rendering equation [15], introduced in 1986, formalised the basis 
upon which images can be generated from spatial descriptions and 
as such represents a useful way of approaching the computer-
generated image1. We will provide an exposition of the rendering 
equation and explain how it provides a theoretical basis for the 
calculation of the distribution of light within space. By then 
carrying out a Deleuzian reading of the equation we argue that it 
suggests an approach to thinking the computer-generated image 
that unshackles it from fixed perceptual viewpoints (human or 
otherwise) and instead consider it as a form of imaging that is 
immanent to space itself. We suggest that this reveals a tacit 
ontology of the image that underpins both Deleuze’s philosophy 
and the computer-generated image, one that potentially shifts our 
understanding of concepts like the virtual and the real.  
2 Deleuze And The Image 
One of the key concerns of Deleuze's philosophy is the concept of 
immanence and the desire to avoid the transcendent in any 
ontological framework. This manifests itself in various ways but 
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one of the basic ones is that philosophy is not about uncovering 
or establishing some fundamental truths about the world, as such 
truths would be transcendent in nature. Instead, philosophy is 
about the creation of concepts [10], with concepts being the things 
that allow us to make sense of the world, or engage with it in some 
meaningful way. Crucially though, these concepts are created 
rather than discovered, they do not pre-exist in some sort of a 
priori Kantian sense, and therefore philosophy is essentially a 
creative act that makes possible certain ways of thinking and 
being in the world. In fact, for Deleuze thought itself is a particular 
possibility that arises as a result of the existence of certain 
conditions. As Claire Colebrook explains, these conditions involve 
the human brain being confronted with `what is not itself', and 
that only by `confronting the unthought, the accidental and the 
unthinking do we begin to think' [5]. 
Deleuze's books on cinema [8][9] present both a detailed 
analysis of 20th Century cinema and an exploration of the 
implications of the medium with respect to his various 
philosophical commitments. Deleuze sees cinema as a mode of 
perception, a particular way of accessing the world that has both 
differences and commonalities with the forms of access facilitated 
by our own perceptual apparatus. Crucially, cinema is a mode of 
perception that we can ourselves observe through the act of 
cinema-going, therefore providing the possibility of reflecting on 
our own conditions of perception. At the core of this is a 
somewhat unorthodox conception of the image, one that varies 
radically from traditional visual culture accounts. In such 
traditional formulations we think of the image as a form of 
representation: the image is an image of something and there is 
an external world which is there to be imaged. Deleuze however 
sees this as another way of introducing a transcendental term, 
with the image being given a privileged status over that which is 
being imaged. 
What he presents instead is a picture of a universe that consists 
of a flux of potential imagery. An image in this sense then is not a 
representation, but instead it is a slice that can be grabbed from 
this flux by some sort of perceptual apparatus, a perceptual 
apparatus that may or may not be human, and may or may not 
possess that particular self-reflective quality that we call 
consciousness. Deleuze also insists on a universe that is constantly 
in motion so the default state of an image, in this sense, is to be 
what he calls a movement-image, something that is a slice of this 
moving flux (`The movement-image and flowing-matter are 
strictly the same thing' [8]). This is why he can claim that the ` … 
material universe, the plane of immanence, is the machine-
assemblage of movement-images' [8], p.67, or in other words, the 
set of all possible movement-images. 
Where does consciousness fit into this picture? Perception is 
the process of grabbing images from this flux and if this is done 
by what Deleuze, following Henri Bergson [1], calls a centre of 
indetermination, then there is a possibility of acting upon the 
images received, and we then have consciousness. Deleuze 
suggests that the brain is 'nothing but this - an interval, a gap 
 
2 Claire Colebrook argues that Deleuze and Bergson's account of human perception 
has been largely supported by neuroscience research [5, p.10]. 
between an action and a reaction' and 'constitutes a centre of 
indetermination in the acentred universe of images' [8]. This 
places the concept of the image right at the heart of perception 
but does so in such a way that perception is not the creation of 
images as representations, but rather is a particular way of 
engaging with a universe of imagery that is already there. If this 
engagement involves the possibility of a response then we have 
conscious life. This however is a special case of perception, and 
perception in Deleuze's ontology is not limited to conscious living 
entities, but distributed widely among all things. Everything has 
the possibility of imaging everything else. 
We can perhaps now see that Deleuze's particular interest in 
the cinema revolves around the cinematic apparatus as a mode of 
perception, one that is interesting because it mirrors in some 
respects the workings of our own. The reason for this is that our 
own vision is more like a cine-camera than a static photographic 
camera. As Martin Jay reminds us, the `eye can only do its job by 
being in constant motion' and it 'rapidly jumps from one briefly 
fixated point to another through what are known as saccadic 
movements' [14]. These briefly fixated points are akin to what 
Deleuze calls immobile sections and Bergson calls snapshots. Like 
a photograph, they do not contain movement per se, but we 
reconstruct movement from them, allowing us to perceive 
movement and therefore giving access to what Deleuze calls the 
movement-image2. 
Deleuze credits Henri Bergson with the concept of the 
movement-image (in Chapter 1 of Matter And Memory [1]) but 
differs from Bergson with respect to whether cinema constitutes 
an example of it. Bergson vigorously attacked the modern 
scientific tendency to provide a quantitative analysis of movement 
by dividing time into equally spaced intervals, arguing that a 
reconstruction of movement from these sampled points only gives 
us a false movement, and fails to account for an indivisible 
conscious experience of time, which he called duration. For this 
reason, Bergson dismissed the cinema, since it attempts to 
reconstruct movement from snapshots equally spaced along a 
timeline at 24 frames per second [2]. Deleuze argues though that 
Bergson failed to appreciate two things. Firstly, that this is not 
entirely dissimilar to how our perception operates (even though 
Bergson had written about this in his earlier work), and secondly, 
that Bergson did not live to see the forms of cinema that would 
emerge as a result of innovations such as moving cameras and 
montage. For Deleuze, these innovations mean that the cine-
camera operates in a similar way to the eye: a roving, mobile 
viewpoint that can rapidly jump around within the image flux, 
reconstructing movement from what it encounters. 
So, the key point here is that the images themselves are 
immanent to the world (flux) rather than created in some way by 
a (transcendent) consciousness or perceptual apparatus. 
Perception represents a slice through this flux. Deleuze 
conceptualizes photography and film as similar slices through the 
flux (selections of imagery) which is why he could regard cinema 
at least as a form of perception and specifically as a form of 




perception that contains the movement-image that is so critical to 
our own perceptual experience of the world. Deleuze did not 
however grant this status to photography, regarding it as a 
somewhat impoverished form. For Deleuze, a photograph was just 
an 'immobile section' of the flux, incapable of capturing the 
movement and change that was ontologically fundamental to his 
process philosophy. Photography only finds it true calling when 
combined with the cinematic apparatus, whose basic 24-frames 
per second mechanism facilitates the capture of movement-
images but also, through editing, sequencing and montage, gives 
us new forms of movement-image that are not the habitual ones 
normally directly accessible to us3. 
We can now summarise more clearly what we mean by the 
concept of an immanent image. We consider an image that 
demonstrates a condition of immanence to be one that does not 
arise from some fixed subject position or vantage point. Images 
traditionally are thought of as having a default condition of 
transcendence. The process by which an image is produced 
involves an artist, an observer, an `imaginer', or even a camera, 
that stands outside, or transcends, that which is being `imaged'. 
This is the subject-object relationship that is embodied in 
Cartesisn dualism and which forms the basis of how we generally 
understand the operation of imagery4. An immanent image on the 
other hand is one that exists already as part of the world. For 
Deleuze, a process of perception is something that can grab these 
images and since these images are slices of a moving flux we can 
call them movement-images. 
3 The Computer Generated Image 
Having now outlined our reading of the Deleuzian account of the 
image as presented in the Cinema books we can now move on to 
consider how this relates to the forms of digitally generated 
imagery that are of concern to us. Our contention is that the new 
forms of generative imagery that are facilitated by the spatial 
representations identified by Carpo are best understood in terms 
of the ontology of the image introduced by Deleuze, and that such 
an understanding opens up new possibilities for how we might 
grapple with the notions of the virtual and the real that inevitably 
arise in their wake. Furthermore, we contend that Kajiya's 
rendering equation provides the key to unlocking a Deleuzian 
account of the nature of contemporary digital imaging 
technologies that takes the concept of an immanent image as 
being fundamental. 
Before embarking on an exposition of the rendering equation 
it's worth pausing to consider other cases where the concept of an 
immanent image has been introduced. Kevin DeLuca's concern is 
with how we critically appraise photographs [11] and he argues 
that conventional visual culture practices of reading and 
interpretation are transcendent categories akin to the subject 
 
3 If cinema can be considered quite literally as a slice of the universe then this 
explains why the universe itself can also be regarded as some sort of conglomeration 
of all possible cinema, or as Deleuze puts it, a metacinema. 
4 Many writers have explored how, for better or worse, the disembodied eye implied 
by the Cartesian worldview has dominated Western visual culture. See for example 
[14], [6] and [12]. 
dominating an object. Instead, for DeLuca, we should be 
recognising photographs as Deleuzian bodies with affective 
properties that are immanent to them. Damian Sutton [18] also 
relates the concept of the immanent image to the photograph but 
more directly engages with digital imaging. Sutton suggests that 
Deleuze was somewhat premature in his dismissal of 
photography. His argument is that networked new media and 
mobile phone photography have brought to photography the 
forms of mobility and movement that Deleuze granted to cinema 
but denied to photography. Contemporary photographic practices 
like photosharing websites, web based collages of imagery, 
hyperlinked photographs and so on, result in new forms of 
movement-images. The immanence of the image here is located in 
the plethora of online-imagery now available to be repurposed, re-
edited, remixed and re-imagined. Such imagery has effectively 
become unshackled from the subject-position of its original 
creator(s) and because of the embedding of the camera into mobile 
phones it has also become widely distributed and interconnected 
because of networked media. It now exists as a flux of imagery 
ready to be sliced through by some perceptual apparatus. Sutton 
makes a compelling case that just like cinema became a radically 
different medium after Bergon's time, the same thing has 
happened to photography after Deleuze, and hence a reappraisal 
is necessary. However Sutton's focus is still on traditional 
photographic imagery, albeit presented to us in an entirely 
different form. 
We argue that an even more radical immanence of the image 
arises as a result of the use of the digital computer to generate 
imagery as well as simply capture and distribute it. As noted 
previously this sort of imagery relies on some form of spatial 
representation, by which we mean that the pictorial space is 
described in a precise mathematical manner 5 . Once this 
representation has been created, either manually or by an 
automatic scanning procedure, rendering algorithms can be 
employed to generate images. We refer to such images as 
computer-generated images in order to highlight the centrality of 
the digital computer and the generative (or algorithmic) element 
to their creation. 
Friedrich Kittler [16] grapples with the implications of this 
technology with an explicit focus on the screen upon which the 
images are to be displayed. He refers to the `complete 
addressability' of all pixels and concludes (not necessarily 
pejoratively) that such images represent `forgery incarnate'. The 
most relevant part of his essay though is his identification of 
Kajiya's rendering equation [15] as the basis from which all other 
computer graphics rendering algorithms can be derived6. 
The rendering equation describes an idealised calculation of 
light transport within some mathematically described space. 
Kajiya's innovation was not the introduction of a new type of 
rendering algorithm but rather the recognition that all existing 
rendering algorithms can be derived from a single equation. The 
5 Pictorial space refers to the illusory three dimensional space that seems to recede 
backwards from the surface of a two dimensional painting or other form of image.    
6 Kittler refers to these algorithms as optic modes and astutely recognises that one of 
the unique properties of computer graphics as a medium is that these optic modes 
are optional and interchangeable 
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equation therefore functions as a sine qua non from which the 
essential conditions of the production of rendered imagery can be 
determined. The core insight is that all rendering algorithms 
involve the simulation, or calculation, of light transport, or as 
Kajiya puts it: “ … all rendering methods attempt to model the 
same physical phenomena, that of light scattering off various 
types of surfaces” [15]. To take a simple example: suppose I have 
a representation of a space which consists of a single chair inside 
a room with four walls (see Figure 1}7. Suppose also I want an 
algorithm to generate an image of this chair from a particular 
viewpoint within the space. One of the things the algorithm will 
have to do is, for each visible point on the chair, calculate how 
much light is reflecting off that point in the direction of the 
viewpoint. By doing so it can then determine how bright or dark 
that particular point should appear in the resulting image 8 . 
However, in order to do this calculation it will need also to be able 
to compute light transport between lots of other pairs of points 
within the space. For example, it might need to compute how 
much light is being transmitted from a light source on the ceiling 
to that point on the chair. It might need to compute how much 
light is being reflected from some point on the wall to that point 
on the chair. This is why the rendering equation becomes a 
generalised light transport equation that provides a mathematical 
framework within which we can design ways of calculating how 
light moves within some representation of space. The equation is 
formulated by Kajiya as follows: 
 




The term on the left-hand side of the equation, 𝐼(𝑥, 𝑥%), is the 
thing we are attempting to calculate, and it corresponds to the 
intensity of light reaching a point 𝑥 from the direction of another 
point 𝑥′. For example, the point 𝑥 might represent the viewpoint 
and the point 𝑥′ might represent a point within the pictorial space 
that is potentially visible from 𝑥. On the right-hand side of the 
equation 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑥%) is what Kajiya refers to as the geometry term. 
This indicates whether there is a non-occluded path from 𝑥′ to 𝑥. 
If there is something in the way, it is going to be zero, obviating 
the need for any further calculation as no light can therefore travel 
between the two points9. Assuming then that there is some light 
transport between these two points then the equation indicates 
that in order to calculate exactly how much we need to add two 
things together. The first one is the amount of light being emitted 
from point 𝑥′  in the direction of 𝑥 . This is expressed in the 
equation by 𝜖(𝑥, 𝑥%) and will be zero unless 𝑥′ is a point on the 
surface of a light source. The second one is the amount of light 
reaching point 𝑥′ from every other point in the space (represented 
by 𝑥′′) and subsequently being reflected (or refracted) towards 𝑥. 
 
7 These images were created using the popular Blender modelling software and the 
Cycles rendering engine that is integrated into Blender. Cycles uses a variant of the 
path tracing algorithm, a method of producing a partial solution to the rendering 
equation using stochastic methods 
8 Reducing this calculation to the question of 'how much light is reflecting' is of 
course a gross simplification being employed in order to simplify the exposition. In 
reality, the algorithm would need to calculate 'how much' light is reflecting across a 
In many cases this will be zero but since any other point in the 
scene can potentially send light in the direction of 𝑥′ this must all 
be accounted for. This second term is represented by the integral 
on the right of the equation. The term 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑥%, 𝑥%%) expresses the 
reflectance characteristics of the surface at the point 𝑥′ and is a 
function that would have to compute how much light from 𝑥′′ 
would be reflected towards 𝑥  and the term 𝐼(𝑥, 𝑥%%) is an instance 
of the rendering equation itself that equates to the amount of light 
arriving from this direction in the first place. 
If we attempt to solve this equation then we immediately 
encounter two problems. The first one is that the integral part of 
the equation requires us to calculate how much light reaches a 
particular point from every other point in the space, which is an 
infinite calculation since there are an infinite number of such 
points. The second problem is that even to do one of these 
calculations, in other words to calculate how much light is 
incoming from one of these points, we would have to solve the 
rendering equation for that point and that direction, something 
which we have just established requires an infinite number of 
calculations anyway. Even worse, one of these calculations may 
well be the one we started off trying to calculate in the first place, 
and therefore is one that, by definition, we don't have the answer 
to. This is what Kittler means by saying that the `unknown 
function occurs both within and outside the integral' [16, p.43] and 
to conclude that the rendering equation presents computer 
graphics with an `unreachable goal' [16]. 
Kittler might be unduly pessimistic here as many well-known 
methods exist for tackling these sorts of equations. Much of 
Kajiya’s paper is concerned with how the application of these 
various methods result in specific ways of approaching solutions 
to the equation, each of which corresponds to a specific rendering 
algorithm with specific characteristics. Kajiya refers to these as 
“approximations to the solution of the rendering equation” [15, 
p.145] reflecting the fact that a complete solution is not possible. 
These approximations range from sophisticated probabilistic 
techniques such as Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to drastic 
simplifications of the problem space. For example, one drastic 
simplification would be to assume that light does not reflect from 
point to point and we only need concern ourselves with light that 
strikes a point directly from a light source. Once this assumption 
has been made, we can easily design an algorithm to create images 
on this basis. 
Such an algorithm would generally involve the specification of 
an observation point (often called a camera) from which the image 
is to be generated. This of course corresponds to the idea of the 
traditional transcendental term that we mentioned at the 
beginning. However, the rendering equation itself designates no 
such viewpoint from which the world is to be depicted, and the 
first mention of an ‘eye’ does not occur until section 3 of Kajiya’s 
paper. The fact that many solutions to the equation proceed on the 
complex and continuous spectrum of wavelengths and also take refraction and 
transmission into account. 
9 A simple version of the geometry term would return a zero or a one depending on 
whether there was an non-occluded path between the two points or not. A more 
sophisticated one would take into account light falloff over distance, as Kajiya 
suggests when explaining it, or potentially other phenomena such as transparency 
or participatory media.   




basis of a viewpoint and a view direction does not negate the fact 
that the equation itself describes the distribution of light within 
the space without reference to any such subject position. 
We therefore propose that Deleuze’s account of the image and 
Kajiya’s formalization of the rendering process have unexpected 
commonalities in that both are underwritten by a tacit ontology 
that reorients the notion of an image away from a transcendent 
subject position and towards an immanent process of imaging. A 
Deleuzian reading of the rendering equation suggests that it 
represents a formal encapsulation of Deleuze's notion of the 
universe as a flux of imagery that exists independently of a 
subject. It builds into the very machinery of graphics technology 
the idea that images are not created by a transcendent 
consciousness (or camera) but rather exist immanently in their 
own right, waiting to be selected by some centre of 
indetermination (to use Bergson's terminology).  
Kittler gestures towards this at the end of his essay by referring 
to Heidegger's account of the etymology of the word 
phenomenology as meaning `to gather that which appears' and 
claiming that in computer graphics such gathering `no longer 
requires any Dasein' [16, p.45]. One of the simplifications of the 
equation is to replace the infinitude of points with a finite set of 
surfaces and consequently make it possible to compute the 
complete distribution of light within the environment 10 . This 
approach proceeds independently of an observer (Dasein or 
otherwise), with one only being added later in order to specify 
what viewpoint we want to use to generate an image for display. 
We claim that this generation can be thought of not as a 
generation at all but as a selection, since the strictly geometric 
environment has now been replaced with a geometric 
environment augmented with the results of lighting 
computations, giving us something more akin to the set of all 
possible images. Once again, we note the parallels with Deleuze 
and his conception of the world as being comprised of a plane of 
immanence consisting of images: 
This infinite set of images constitutes a kind of plane of 
immanence. The image exists in itself, on this plane. This 
in-itself of the image is matter: not something hidden 
behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute 
identity of the image and movement [8, p.66]. 
The rendering equation is primarily concerned with light 
transport so ontologically speaking its relevance seems limited to 
appearances and optics. However the ontology that Deleuze 
promotes in the Cinema books refuses to draw a distinction 
between how things are and how things appear (`the plane is not 
distinct from this presentation of planes') and this is what allows 
him to conceive of 'an Appearing' when `there is not even an eye'. 
He puts it more explicitly: `the plane of immanence is entirely 
made of up Light' [8, p.67]. This emphasis on the ontological 
centrality of light is echoed in the centrality of light to the 
rendering equation.   Deleuze's claims that there is `a diffusion or 
propagation of light on the whole plane of immanence' and that 
'if (images) do not appear to anyone, that is to the eye, this is 
 
10  This approach is known as radiosity and is derived from work at NASA on 
computing heat transfer between surfaces on spacecraft. 
because light is not yet reflected or stopped … in other words, the 
eye is in things, in luminous images in themselves' [8, p.68] is 
reminiscent of the sort of distributed and decentred computation 
of light transport that is implied by the equation. 
To sum up this part of our argument, we are claiming that 
Kajiya's rendering equation makes explicit a core characteristic of 
all digital imaging technologies that are based on the rendering of 
spatial representations. This is that computer-generated imagery 
is not by definition computed on the basis of a fixed single 
viewpoint and hence breaks with a visual culture tradition that 
emphasises the disembodied Cartesian subject position. Instead, 
this type of image creation is merely a special case of a more 
general form of imaging that can proceed independently of any 
fixed viewpoint and that operates by means of a generalised 
computation of light transport within the space. We argue that 
this closely parallels a very different conception of the image, one 
proposed by Deleuze, that decentres the subject and regards 
images as immanent to the world as opposed to being generated 
by the viewer as representations of that world. We now conclude 
by considering the implications of this in terms of the increasing 
ubiquity of this form of imagery and in terms of how it might 
reorient our understanding of commonly applied terminology 
such as the real and the virtual. 
3 The Real And The Virtual 
We started this discussion by referring to Mario Carpo's claim that 
we are moving from an image culture to a spatial one, meaning a 
culture whose representations of the world consist primarily of 
digitisations of space as opposed to pictures. Somewhat 
paradoxically this does not reduce the importance of the image, as 
digital rendering technology means that images of these spatial 
representations can be rapidly and automatically generated. As 
Jorge Luis Borges pointed out in his story about a map of the 
world that eventually becomes more detailed than the world it 
purports to represent [3] such a situation must cause us to 
reconsider our perceptual experience of being-in-the-world and in 
particular our notion of what constitutes the real and what 
constitutes some sort of digital virtual. Yuk Hui refers to living 
within a `hybrid environment' where boundaries between the 
artificial and the natural begin to collapse [13] and we would 
suggest that this is accelerated by a situation whereby the imagery 
we are confronted with is of uncertain provenance and whose 
indexical relationship to what we think of as the real world has 
been shattered completely. 
Traditional understandings of the virtual and the real rely on 
the existence of an unbridgeable divide between these two things. 
This is most clearly manifested in Virtual Reality (VR), where the 
difference between the real world that the user normally inhabits 
and the virtual one, they enter after donning the headset, could 
not be clearer. Deleuze however, writing well before the advent of 
virtual reality technology [7], offers us a very different 
understanding of the virtual and the real 11 . For Deleuze, the 
11 Deleuze’s Difference And Repetition was published in the original French in 1968. 
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virtual is not the opposite of the real, but the opposite of the 
actual. The virtual refers to a plane of immanent possibilities, 
some of which may become actualised. So the virtual is a plane of 
immanence, a domain of possibility, from which the actual might 
emerge, be extracted from, or selected. One of the ways in which 
this might happen is by means of a perceptual apparatus selecting 
images from the flux (possible a human, possibly a cine-camera, 
possibly something else). So, when someone puts on a VR headset 
he or she is not entering a virtual world but rather something that 
is a particular actualisation of a more immanent virtuality. 
What makes this encounter with Deleuze's thought 
particularly fruitful though is his claim that this situation is not 
something that is unique to digital technologies but instead is 
something that is rooted in perceptual experience itself. In Cinema 
1 perception itself is posited as a process of selection, an 
actualisation of virtual possibilities that are already present. 
Deleuze’s reformulation of the image as something that is 
immanent as opposed to transcendent supports the idea of 
perception as an actualization of the virtual and, as we have 
argued, shares common ground with the mathematical 
underpinnings of contemporary computer graphics. This seems a 
more useful characterisation of the digital milieu in which we now 
operate: rather than setting up a spurious distinction between the 
real world in which our bodies are located and a digital one that 
we enter into via our devices, we instead accept that all these 
things are multiple, intersecting and overlapping planes of 
immanence that we can move fluidly between. It's not that so-
called virtual worlds are becoming more real, or replacing the real, 
but rather that all worlds are already virtual, including the one 
that we habitually refer to as real. 
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